Title:  PowerDrive: Accurate De-obfuscation and Analysis of PowerShell Malware
Internal authors: 
Issue Date:  2019
Authors:  Ugarte, Denis; Maiorca, Davide; Cara, Fabrizio; Giacinto, Giorgio
International coauthors:  no
Language:  Inglese
Book title:  Detection of Intrusions and Malware, and Vulnerability Assessment
ISBN:  978-3-030-22037-2
Publisher name:  Springer
Book editors:  Roberto Perdisci, ClĂ©mentine Maurice, Giorgio Giacinto, Magnus Almgren
Volume:  11543
First page:  1
Last page:  21
Number of pages:  21
Digital Object Identifier (DOI):  http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-22038-9_12
Scopus identifier:  2-s2.0-85067790860
ISI identifier:  WOS:000502716000012
Peer review:  Comitato scientifico
Conference name:  Detection of Intrusions and Malware, and Vulnerability Assessment (DIMVA)
Conference date:  19-20 Giugno 2019
Conference place:  Goteborg (Svezia)
Abstract:  PowerShell is nowadays a widely-used technology to administrate and manage Windows-based operating systems. However, it is also extensively used by malware vectors to execute payloads or drop additional malicious contents. Similarly to other scripting languages used by malware, PowerShell attacks are challenging to analyze due to the extensive use of multiple obfuscation layers, which make the real malicious code hard to be unveiled. To the best of our knowledge, a comprehensive solution for properly de-obfuscating such attacks is currently missing. In this paper, we present PowerDrive, an open-source, static and dynamic multi-stage de-obfuscator for PowerShell attacks. Power-Drive instruments the PowerShell code to progressively de-obfuscate it by showing the analyst the employed obfuscation steps. We used Power-Drive to successfully analyze thousands of PowerShell attacks extracted from various malware vectors and executables. The attained results show interesting patterns used by attackers to devise their malicious scripts. Moreover, we provide a taxonomy of behavioral models adopted by the analyzed codes and a comprehensive list of the malicious domains contacted during the analysis.
Type: 4.1 Contributo in Atti di convegno

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